Date: 2016
Type: Thesis
Resisting a European fiscal union : the centralized fragmentation of fiscal powers during the euro crisis
Florence : European University Institute, 2016, EUI PhD theses, Department of Political and Social Sciences
SCHLOSSER, Pierre, Resisting a European fiscal union : the centralized fragmentation of fiscal powers during the euro crisis, Florence : European University Institute, 2016, EUI PhD theses, Department of Political and Social Sciences - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/44566
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
The euro crisis has been an existential crisis for Europe and for its stateless currency. It substantially impacted the institutional evolution of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), making EMU’s rules-based logic tumble and triggering an institutional capacitybuilding. The euro crisis period should therefore be regarded as the most constitutionally relevant post-Maastricht European integration moment. This dissertation claims that the euro crisis management, because it involved the adoption of an array of significant fiscal rules, instruments, mechanisms and bodies, has resulted in the institutionalization of a distinctive fiscal authority in Europe. The convoluted process through which this authority has emerged was characterised by a tension between countervailing forces of centralization and fragmentation. This dissertation hence conceptualizes, documents and interprets the logic of a singular institutionalization process in which new fiscal powers became concomitantly centralized, fragmented and delegated to a series of ad hoc bodies operating in the shadow of newly empowered EMU executive institutions. The centrifugal delegation pattern at play is intriguing because it runs against the classic, pre-Maastricht delegation trend that entrusted the European Commission with newly centralized tasks. The new fiscal centre is instead fundamentally fragmented among three key actors: the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and the Commission. Indeed, the dissertation has found that despite the emergence of a fiscal centre, the European Union still does not dispose of a formalized and settled fiscal power structure. The main puzzle uncovered by this examination is that while a fiscal authority has been institutionalized, no political EU actor has been able to formally embody and exclusively claim this authority. Going forward, formalizing such a political authority would require some form of constitutional settlement to clarify who is Europe’s fiscal primus inter pares.
Additional information:
Defence date: 20 December 2016; Examining Board: Professor Stefano Bartolini, (EUI - Supervisor); Professor Renaud Dehousse (EUI - formerly at Sciences Po Paris - Co-Supervisor); Professor Henrik Enderlein (Hertie School of Governance); Professor Adrienne Héritier (EUI)
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/44566
Full-text via DOI: 10.2870/335778
Series/Number: EUI PhD theses; Department of Political and Social Sciences
LC Subject Heading: Fiscal policy -- European Union countries; Taxation -- European Union countries; European Union countries -- Economic policy; European Union countries -- Economic integration
Published version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/60072
Preceding version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46292
Version: Chapter 3 ‘Enhancing EMU’s fiscal arm: towards stronger regulatory surveillance' of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as an article 'Public finances in Europe: fortifying EU economic governance in the shadow of the crisis' (2016) in the journal ‘Journal of European integration’