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dc.contributor.authorESPOSITO, Fabrizio
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-13T14:52:46Z
dc.date.available2017-02-13T14:52:46Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationMateriali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 2016, No. 1, pp. 225-238en
dc.identifier.issn1120-9607
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/45269
dc.description.abstractThe article analyses the conceptual relation between Pareto efficiency ("at lease so¬meone is better-off and no one is worse-off") and allocative efficiency ("consumer welfare is maximized"). In particular, it points out that voluntary exchanges are not always Pareto efficient for the contracting parties and that not all Pareto efficient exchanges are allocative efficient. The latter result highlights a tension in the conceptual foundations of mainstream economic analysis of law: on the one hand, Pareto efficiency is generally considered an unsustainably strict normative criterion and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is preferred; on the other, the allocative efficiency of markets is praised.en
dc.language.isoiten
dc.relation.ispartofMateriali per una storia della cultura giuridicaen
dc.titleEfficienza paretiana ed efficienza allocativa : considerazioni teoriche per giuseconomistien
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1436/82985
dc.identifier.volume2016en
dc.identifier.startpage225en
dc.identifier.endpage238en
dc.identifier.issue1en


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