dc.contributor.author | LESSA KERSTENETZKY, Celia | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-03T14:18:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-07-03T14:18:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Cambridge journal of economics, 2009, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 193-209 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0309-166X | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1464-3545 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/47110 | |
dc.description | First published online: 18 November 2008 | en |
dc.description.abstract | In the context of a critique of the exclusive use of the rational choice approach in economics, the article presents a pluralistic interpretation of the Popperian notion of situational logic as an alternative approach. This is proposed in connection with a reading of the rationality principle as a rationalisability principle. I argue that this principle can accommodate an ample array of rational responses to different situations and even rationalise the multiple responses that are given to the same situation. I present some examples to illustrate the relevance of the proposed interpretation. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Cambridge journal of economics | en |
dc.relation.isbasedon | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/5188 | |
dc.title | Plural situational logic : the rationa(lisabi)lity principle | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/cje/ben049 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 33 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 193 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 209 | en |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | en |
dc.description.version | The article is a revised version of the author’s EUI PhD thesis, 1998 | |