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dc.contributor.authorDENNISON, James
dc.contributor.authorDRAEGE, Jonas Bergan
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-23T10:20:06Z
dc.date.available2018-01-23T10:20:06Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationMediterranean politics, 2018, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 403-409en
dc.identifier.issn1362-9395
dc.identifier.issn1743-9418
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/50486
dc.descriptionPublished online: 21 Mar 2017en
dc.description.abstractThis article seeks to explain the rejection of the reforms proposed in the 2016 Constitutional Referendum in Italy. We contend that Renzi's promise to resign if he were to lose the referendum did not significantly affect the final result. While highly partisan voting patterns may lead to speculation that this so-called personalization strategy caused the rejection, we argue that voters probably would have followed party cues anyway. Instead, we argue that the fundamental explanation for the results was voter ambivalence towards the reforms themselves, based on insufficient information about the complex package and its broad coalition of opponents.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)en
dc.relation.ispartofMediterranean politicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries[Migration Policy Centre]en
dc.titleMaking sense of Italy’s constitutional referendumen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/13629395.2017.1302224
dc.identifier.volume23en
dc.identifier.startpage403en
dc.identifier.endpage409en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue3en


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