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dc.contributor.authorSUZUKI, Akisato
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-08T07:14:19Z
dc.date.available2018-10-08T07:14:19Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationResearch and politics, 2018, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 1-7en
dc.identifier.issn2053-1680
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/59206
dc.descriptionFirst Published July 26, 2018en
dc.descriptionThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 Licenseen
dc.description.abstractDoes the state of the domestic economy change the size of the effect of audience costs? As public opinion research has shown, citizens assess the performance of their leaders based not only on foreign policy, but also on the domestic economy. Thus, if leaders are subject to audience costs, they should be even less able to afford failure in an international crisis when the economy is performing badly than when the economy is doing well. As a result, such leaders should be even more able to make their threats credible and, therefore, are more likely to be successful in coercive diplomacy. This novel prediction finds no empirical support in a replication study using Moon and Souva (2016). I discuss possible reasons for this result and avenues for further research.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsen
dc.relation.ispartofResearch and politicsen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleAudience costs, domestic economy and coercive diplomacyen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/2053168018787119
dc.identifier.volume5en
dc.identifier.startpage1en
dc.identifier.endpage7en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue3en


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