| dc.contributor.author | SPIGANTI, Alessandro | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-29T15:34:36Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-10-29T15:34:36Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Scandinavian journal of economics, 2018, OnlineFirst | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0347-0520 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1467-9442 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/59446 | |
| dc.description | First published: 03 October 2018 | en |
| dc.description | This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | |
| dc.description.abstract | Is there any such thing as too much capital when it comes to the financing of innovative projects? We study a principal-agent model in which the principal chooses the scale of the experiment, and the agent privately observes the outcome realizations and can privately choose the novelty of the project. When the agent has private access to a safe but non-innovative project, the principal starves the agent of funds to incentivise risk-taking. The principal quickly scales up after early successes, and may tolerate early failures. If the principal is equally informed about the outcome, the agent is well-resourced, resembling a large R&D department. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | en |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Scandinavian journal of economics | en |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.title | Can starving start-ups beat fat labs? : a bandit model of innovation with endogenous financing constraint | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/sjoe.12333 | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
