| dc.contributor.author | GREENWOOD, Jeremy | |
| dc.contributor.author | KIRCHER, Philipp | |
| dc.contributor.author | SANTOS, Cezar | |
| dc.contributor.author | TERTILT, Michele | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-28T13:12:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-28T13:12:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | American economic review, 2017, Vol. 107, No. 5, pp. 158-162 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1944-7981 | EN |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/59588 | |
| dc.description | Published: May 2017 | |
| dc.description.abstract | How might policies that promote marriage and/or dissuade divorce help in the fight against HIV/AIDS? This question is addressed employing a choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model, using Malawi as a case study. In the framework developed, individuals can choose between married and single life. A single person can select among abstinence and sex with or without a condom. The results suggest that marriage-friendly policies can help to abate HIV/AIDS. The policy predictions that obtain from general equilibrium analysis are compared with those that arise from simulated synthetic field experiments and epidemiological studies. | |
| dc.publisher | American Economic Association | en |
| dc.relation.ispartof | American economic review | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.title | The role of marriage in fighting HIV : a quantitative illustration for Malawi | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.p20171056 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 107 | |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 158 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 162 | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 5 | |