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dc.contributor.authorHAKELBERG, Lukas
dc.contributor.authorSCHAUB, Max
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-06T13:55:32Z
dc.date.available2018-12-06T13:55:32Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationRegulation & governance, 2018, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 353-370
dc.identifier.issn1748-5983
dc.identifier.issn1748-5991en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/59963
dc.descriptionFirst published: 16 June 2017en
dc.description.abstractWhy do tax havens, whose attractiveness for foreign investors depends upon financial secrecy, agree to automatically report account data to foreign governments? From a contractualist perspective, their cooperation should be motivated by the expectation of joint gains. Prior to such agreement, however, tax havens expected outflows of foreign capital and reductions in economic activity as likely outcomes. We show that the United States (US) imposed automatic information exchange on these countries without itself participating. The result is a strongly redistributive regime that worsens the economic situation of tax havens. By means of a difference-in-differences analysis, we ascertain a substantial and statistically significant negative effect of a US sanction threat on the value of assets held by foreigners in tax havens relative to non-havens. The effect becomes stronger when the US is included in the non-haven group. The analysis confirms the US's ability to redistribute financial wealth internationally through organized hypocrisy.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.ispartofRegulation & governance
dc.subjectCapital flows
dc.subjectCoercion
dc.subjectFATCA
dc.subjectSanctions
dc.subjectTax havens
dc.subjectTax competitionen
dc.subjectCooperationen
dc.subjectPoweren
dc.subjectPoliticsen
dc.subjectDepositsen
dc.subjectCoercionen
dc.subjectStruggleen
dc.subjectEvasionen
dc.subjectWealthen
dc.subjectHavensen
dc.titleThe redistributive impact of hypocrisy in international taxation
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/rego.12156
dc.identifier.volume12
dc.identifier.startpage353
dc.identifier.endpage370
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dc.identifier.issue3


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