| dc.contributor.author | VAN LEEUWEN, Barend | |
| dc.contributor.author | RAMALINGAM, Abhijit | |
| dc.contributor.author | ROJO ARJONA, David | |
| dc.contributor.author | SCHRAM, Arthur | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-13T10:09:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-12-13T10:09:41Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Experimental economics, 2019, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 178–196 | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1573-6938 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/60167 | |
| dc.description | First Online: 20 September 2018 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Springer (part of Springer Nature) | en |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Experimental economics | en |
| dc.title | Centrality and cooperation in networks | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 22 | |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 178 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 196 | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 1 | |