The rise of spending conditionality in the European Union

Abstract

As of the 2014-2020 financial period the EU has made increasing use of its budgetary resources to advance its policy objectives at the Member States' level thorough the use of EU spending conditionality. EU spending conditionality is a requirement linked to EU funds expenditure that aims primarily to induce recipients to adopt a conduct desired by the EU and secure its financial interests. This thesis examines the novel spending conditionality tool, through the lens of four distinct theoretical frameworks, metaphorically called worlds: the conceptual world (Part I), the legal world (Part II), the constitutional world (Part III) and the institutional world (Part IV). Each theoretical framework reveals important findings regarding the conceptual roots, the legal reach, the constitutional significance and institutional realities of spending conditionality in the EU. Based on empirical EU-wide data and detailed case studies, this thesis concludes that despite its sophisticated conceptual form, thick legal setting, potentially far-reaching constitutional implications and the monumental institutional effort to render the tool effective, in practice, the policy output of EU spending conditionality has so far been limited and uncertain. In response, this thesis puts forward several recommendations that may usefully inform the effective future operation of spending conditionality within the EU legal and constitutional system.