dc.contributor.author | D'AMATO, Alessio | |
dc.contributor.author | MAZZANTI, Massimiliano | |
dc.contributor.author | NICOLLI, Francesco | |
dc.contributor.author | ZOLI, Mariangela | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-05T15:51:29Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-05T15:51:29Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Socio-economic planning sciences, 2018, Vol. 64, pp. 56-65 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0038-0121 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/60854 | |
dc.description | Available online 17 January 2018 | en |
dc.description.abstract | Environmental non-compliance is affected by the decentralized shaping of environmental policy by local governments and enforcement actions by public bodies. Illegal waste disposal is examined in a relevant national case, by means of an original regionally disaggregated panel dataset for Italy, a country which witnesses heterogeneous environmental performances across regions and a decentralized policy system. Our empirical analysis produces two main insights of strong policy interest. First, commitment to a more stringent waste policy tends to increase illegal disposal of waste. Second, a nonlinear bell shaped relationship exists between the number of inspections and the quantity of illegal disposal. The key message is that deterrence might only result after a relatively high level of controls is implemented. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Socio-economic planning sciences | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [Florence School of Regulation] | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [Climate] | en |
dc.title | Illegal waste disposal : enforcement actions and decentralized environmental policy | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.seps.2017.12.006 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 64 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 56 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 65 | en |
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