Article 6.8 and Annex II of the WTO agreement on antidumping

Abstract

Article 6.8 of the Antidumping Agreement (AD) allows domestic investigating authorities to make determinations on the basis of the best information available (BIA) when any interested party does not cooperate during an antidumping investigation under the discipline of Annex II of the AD. Since its introduction, this provision has been the source of extensive and neverending litigation in front of both domestic investigating authorities and the Dispute Settlement Body. In this thesis, we research to what extent the findings of the Panels and the Appellate Body regarding Article 6.8 AD are consistent with the mandate set out in Articles 3.2, 11 DSU and 17.6 AD and to what extent they are reasonable from an economic perspective. To answer the first question, we first discuss Articles 3.2, 11 DSU and 17.6 AD to establish what is the mandate of the Panels and the Appellate Body under the Dispute Settlement Body. We then examine the findings of the Panels and the Appellate Body in the interpretation of the seven terms of Article 6.8 AD under the previously established mandate. To answer the second question, we summarize the latest developments in the economic theory of adjudication and litigation. We then discuss the findings of the Panels and the Appellate Body using this economic standard. In the conclusion, we compare the results of our analysis with current negotiations on Article 6.8 AD in the Doha Round framework and further discuss the opportunity to create a single united international investigating authority.