| dc.description.abstract | The chapter discusses the legitimacy of the complex regulatory architecture put in place for the EU banking sector in the aftermath of the crisis. It considers the extent to which the overall architecture, with multiple and distinct authorities pursuing divergent intermediate goals, is oriented at coordinating distinct regulatory perspectives through deliberative processes at supranational level, thus also creating mechanisms for inter-institutional accountability. The SRB – a specific EU agency created within the EU Banking Union – provides an entry point for such an approach to be applied. To this end, the specificity of the SRB, both in EU constitutional terms and its mandate is explained. The chapter then explores the going concern procedures for resolution planning, including their essential elements that is assessment of resolvability and determination of MREL, in order to explore the extent to which policy implementation and enforcement is reliant on inter-institutional cooperation both within the SRM and with other EU bodies. The chapter concludes that the specificity of the SRB as an EU agency means that in the context of forward-looking resolution planning procedures, means of intra- and inter-institutional accountability are put in place and a dedicated space for deliberation on critical under-defined notions, such as ‘public interest in financial stability’ and ‘critical functions’ is created. The fragmentation of modes of public intervention within the complex EU regulatory architecture presumes and safeguards heterogeneity of expert assessment in technical areas of financial regulation, thereby partially legitimating the technocratic procedures and contributing to fuller articulation of the objectives of the overall architecture. | |