The role of governmental commitment on regulated utilities
Energy economics, 2019, Vol. 84, (Art. UNSP 104518), OnlineOnly
DE MEIO REGGIANI, Martin C., VAZQUEZ, Miguel, HALLACK, Michelle, BRIGNOLE, Nelida B., The role of governmental commitment on regulated utilities, Energy economics, 2019, Vol. 84, (Art. UNSP 104518), OnlineOnly - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/66031
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Regulation is generally interpreted as a relational contract between governments and private companies. Besides, regulation plays either a positive or a negative role in infrastructure development. This article is intended to understand the hindrance to stable policies in the regulation of network infrastructures. An original model where governments have a conflictive relationship with regulated companies was developed. The governmental opportunistic behaviour, which undermines the regulatory independence, was introduced in an infinitely repeated game. By including this variation, the hold-up problem can be modelled since a time inconsistency may occur. The model was illustrated using past-decade events about the Argentinean transport network of natural gas, proposing a possible reason for the triggering of a sustained hold-up. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Available online 9 October 2019
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/66031
Full-text via DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104518
ISSN: 0140-9883; 1873-6181
Sponsorship and Funder information:
Agencia Nacional de Promocion Cientifica y Tecnologica (ANPCyT, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Argentina) through Fondo para la Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (FONCyT) [PICT 2012-0691]
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