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dc.contributor.authorGENSCHEL, Philipp
dc.contributor.authorTESCHE, Tobias
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-26T14:38:52Z
dc.date.available2020-03-26T14:38:52Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/66667
dc.descriptionDate written: February 21, 2020en
dc.description.abstractWe argue that the independent agency of EU institutions can serve not only to tie the member states to previous policy commitments, as argued in the extant literature, but also to untie member states from commitments that have become outdated and harmful. The European Central Bank saved the Euro in 2012 not by enforcing the monetary financing prohibition or the no-bail-out clause of the Treaty more strictly but by flouting them. We develop our de-commitment account of supranational agency theoretically, show its workings empirically by a case study of the Eurozone crisis, and discuss its scope conditions. We surmise that supranational de-commitment is a common feature of EU politics.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAmsterdam Centre for European Studiesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesResearch Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2020/02en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/*
dc.subject.otherCoFoEen
dc.subject.otherValues and rightsen
dc.titleSupranational agents as de-commitment devices : the ECB during the Eurozone crisisen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.3557195
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International*


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Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International