| dc.description.abstract | This article considers the narratives of law through the lens of the form-substance
devide. Different legal theories have provided for opposite definitions of law, legal rules
and individual rights, enhancing their identity as due to some substantive content or, on the
contrary, to some formal-functional features. The form-substance antinomy reflects both
institutional and theoretical reasons. It bears down on the relations envisaged among rights,
norms and ends. Different conceptions of rights are best understood as a special
articulation of those three terms, and offer different patterns for rights, depending on their
relation-opposition with collective ends, ethical values, legislation. The following
pages show how in contemporary constitutional democracies the identity of the s.c.
"fundamental" rights and the reason for their being "fundamental" are due to the
functional role they play (as validity criteria in the structure of a legal order), and to
their place among main collective ends. | en |
