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Two Concepts of Social Equality: What Luck Has Got To Do With It?
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1725-6739
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EUI LAW; 2007/04
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SADURSKI, Wojciech, Two Concepts of Social Equality: What Luck Has Got To Do With It?, EUI LAW, 2007/04 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6711
Abstract
A conventional distinction – that between an “individualized” and a “collective” concept of
social equality – is misleading and unhelpful. This can be best shown by reflecting upon
one, particularly interesting, and these days influential, theory of social equality – usually,
but misleadingly, considered to be an epitome of an individualistic approach, namely socalled
“luck egalitarianism”. Luck-egalitarianism is often (and with good reason)
characterized also as responsibility-based egalitarianism – and therefore the relationship
between “luck” and “responsibility” in this general conception of social equality is
considered in this paper. Then, continuing this exploration of the problématique of luck
egalitarianism, the paper discusses, and largely rejects, the fundamental equality-based
objection to luck egalitarianism: that it is unfaithful to some of our widespread, equalitysensitive
intuitions. The essence of this objection (which is reject in the paper) is that luckegalitarianism
is not really egalitarian in a morally attractive way.