Strictly strategy-proof auctions
Mathematical social sciences, 2020, Vol. 107 , pp. 13-16
ESCUDÉ, Matteo, SINANDER, Carl Martin Ludvig, Strictly strategy-proof auctions, Mathematical social sciences, 2020, Vol. 107 , pp. 13-16 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70058
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
First published online: September 2020
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70058
Full-text via DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.002
ISSN: 0165-4896; 1879-3118
Publisher: Elsevier Ltd
Succeeding version: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70876
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