Date: 2007
Type: Working Paper
Constitutionalism and the Regulation of International Markets: How to Define the ‘Development Objectives’ of the World Trading System?
Working Paper, EUI LAW, 2007/23
PETERSMANN, Ernst-Ulrich, Constitutionalism and the Regulation of International Markets: How to Define the ‘Development Objectives’ of the World Trading System?, EUI LAW, 2007/23 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/7045
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
The latin adage ‘ubi commercium, ibi jus’ reflects the insight that the efficiency of
markets and trade depend on legal guarantees of market freedoms (such as freedom of
contract, property rights), legal security (e.g. as incentive for investments and division
of labour) and on legal limitations of ‘market failures’ as well as of ‘government
failures’. Since Adam Smith, economists increasingly acknowledge these
interdependencies between economic, legal and social order, for example between the
economic objective of promoting consumer welfare through legal guarantees of
consumer-driven competition and open markets, and the democratic objective of
protecting individual self-government and peaceful cooperation among citizens through
constitutional guarantees of equal freedoms and social justice. The lawyers, economists
and politicians belonging to the post-war German schools of ‘ordo-liberalism’
(including German chancellor L.Erhard and his secretaries of state W.Hallstein and
A.Müller-Armack who represented Germany in the EEC Treaty negotiations) succeeded
in basing the German and EC ‘economic constitution’ on constitutional guarantees of
market freedoms, competition rules and a ‘social market economy’ committed to respect
for human rights. Yet, the EC initiatives for ‘constitutionalizing’ the world trading
system – for example, by correcting ‘international market failures’ by means of new
WTO competition, environmental, investment and development rules, and for limiting
the WTO’s ‘governance failures’ by democratic and judicial reforms – appear to have
foundered after more than 5 years of negotiations in the ‘Doha Development Round.’
This contribution discusses ‘constitutional problems’ of national and intergovernmental
economic governance from the perspective of constitutional theory and constitutional
economics by using the example of the disagreement among the 151 WTO Members on
defining the ‘development objectives’ of the WTO’s ‘Development Round.’
Constitutional theory suggests to define development as individual freedom, consumerdriven
competition and autonomous development of human capacities protected by
constitutional rights that limit abuses of power at national, transnational and
international levels of human interactions.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/7045
ISSN: 1725-6739
Series/Number: EUI LAW; 2007/23
Publisher: European University Institute