Scenarios of crisis in the Taiwan strait

Abstract

Since Taiwan’s re-election of President Tsai Ing-wen with a legis-lative majority, China has been slowly increasing military pressure against the Republic of China (ROC). The People’s Liberation Army is being modernised to win a Taiwan war. The coercive use of military power signals China’s resolve to thwart Taiwan’s formal independence and to undermine the determination of the Taiwan-ese government, military leadership and general population to re-sist to China’s unification project. In addition to military signalling - the policy toolbox of Beijing includes the economic coercion card of a full-scale military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait - China is considering ‘cognitive operations’ that either impose costs and/or suggest that an increase of costs is an option on the table. At the minimum, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) aims to create perceptions and to affect a cost-benefits calculus regarding future options and choices. At the maximum, such as the seizure of one of Taiwan’s outlying islands,