dc.contributor.author | FUMAGALLI, Chiara | |
dc.contributor.author | MOTTA, Massimo | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-24T08:14:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-10-24T08:14:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.citation | American Economic Review, 2006, 96, 3, 785-795 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/7240 | |
dc.description.abstract | Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers is weak. Under fierce downstream competition, if entry took place, a free buyer would become more competitive and increase its output and profits at the expense of buyers that sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent. Anticipating that orders from a single buyer would trigger entry, no buyer will sign the exclusive deal and entry will occur. This result is robust across different specifications of the game | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | American Economic Review | |
dc.title | Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.neeo.contributor | FUMAGALLI|Chiara|aut| | |
dc.neeo.contributor | MOTTA|Massimo|aut| | |
dc.identifier.volume | 96 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 785 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 795 | |