State compliance with international law in intelligence matters : a behavioural approach

Abstract

Decision-making in intelligence matters is often assumed to be an extra-legal process. This article however shows that the determining factor in compliance is a legal one: the likelihood of the state being held effectively accountable for a breach of international law. Through a behavioural analysis of state conduct in intelligence matters and the modelling of intelligence decision-making, the article demonstrates that state behaviour in intelligence matters can be explained and predicted. Taking compliance as the standard for assessing the effectiveness of regulation, this finding has strategic implications for the actors of the international legal order attempting to enhance compliance. Specifically, increasing the likelihood of effective accountability increases the probability of compliance and decreases the weight given to extra-legal and domestic considerations in decision-making, regardless of the activity and state considered. Hence, rather than focusing on the regulatory framework itself (international law), regulatory approaches aiming to enhance compliance should focus on improving accountability.