| dc.description.abstract | The growth of online labour platforms (e.g., Uber) and social media platforms (e.g., Facebook) has been accompanied by a growing chorus of voices critical of their socio-economic effects. While the initiation of lawsuits and enactment of legislation have been the preferred mechanisms for redressing the maladies of ‘platform capitalism’, in recent years, there has also been a growth of bottom-up, collective action against both types of platforms. One such effort is through the creation of cooperative, democratically controlled alternatives to corporate platforms. This article unpacks the underlying, fundamental motivations for the formation of platform cooperatives. It explores how Merton’s role-set theory provides fresh insight into the characteristics of platform capitalism and why users may seek alternatives such as platform cooperatives. The article begins with a tour of platform capitalism by signposting three of its distinguishing features: the concentration of power in corporate governance and markets, the construction and exploitation of digital profiles and personae, and the cultivation of role and role-set conflicts by the blurring of user statuses. I then apply role-set theory to a particular user – an Uber driver – to reveal the role and role-set conflicts they routinely encounter, and which is an important factor behind the precarious economic condition of many online labour platform users. I subsequently evaluate the prospects and limitations of platform cooperatives reconciling the aforementioned conflicts by conferring on users the status of ‘member’. While the member status does reconcile some of these conflicts, the literature on cooperative governance reveals that granting membership is not a cure-all and there is potential for new conflicts to emerge (e.g., conflict between director-members and ordinary members). I conclude with an analysis of how these potential conflicts faced by members may be overcome through best practises from cooperative governance (e.g., short term limits, role rotation). | en |
