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dc.contributor.authorMÉSZÁROS, Gábor
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-07T12:18:36Z
dc.date.available2022-04-07T12:18:36Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationReview of central and east European law, 2021, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 69-90en
dc.identifier.issn0925-9880
dc.identifier.issn1573-0352
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/74412
dc.descriptionOnline Publication Date: 24 Feb 2021en
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses Hungarian constitutionalism and the emergency model which can be called an ‘autocratic’ emergency model in which the government’s main aim is to create an emergency regime without real threat. That was the case in Hungary before 2020, but as the new coronavirus flourished the Hungarian constitutionalism and the rule of law withered. As the article asserts the declaration of the state of danger was unconstitutional because the human epidemic is not involved in the listing of the constitution. The constitutional concerns have become even more complicated after the acceptance of the “Enabling Act” which gave unconstrained power to the Government. The spirit of Carl Schmitt’s theory again emerges. As the coronavirus and its immediate effect necessitated extra-legal measures, the threshold between the rule of law and exceptionalism was fading swiftly and legal constitutionalism became a pleasant memory.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherBrill Nijhoffen
dc.relation.ispartofReview of central and east European lawen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleCarl Schmitt in Hungary : constitutional crisis in the shadow of Covid-19en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1163/15730352-bja10024
dc.identifier.volume46en
dc.identifier.startpage69en
dc.identifier.endpage90en
dc.identifier.issue1en


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