From radicalisation to violence : the factors shaping Egyptian radical youths’ decisions whether to take up arms

Abstract

On 14 August 2013, the Egyptian security forces ended Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins in Cairo and Giza. After hours of clashes between the security forces and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter left the square through safe corridors created by the security forces. Angry, humiliated and defeated, some of these youths would leave the square to establish/join violent groups, while others would not. How can these different attitudes be explained? Why did some youths decide to take up arms while others, who went through the same experience, decided not to? What factors shaped these decisions? To answer this question, this paper analyses the paths of Islamist youths who took part in the Islamist popular mobilisation from 2013 to 2015. The paper argues that political and socio-economic grievances might have led youths to radicalise but they were not enough to lead them to violence. To make the transition from radicalisation to violence three elements are essential: an ideational frame that justifies the use of violence; a cost/benefit calculation that the benefits from using violence outweigh the cost; and legitimate voices that support this path. The presence or a lack of these three elements can either facilitate or block paths to violence.