Asymmetric interstate solidarity and return sponsorship

Abstract

The ‘flexible’ interstate solidarity model envisaged by the 2020‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’(‘the Pact’) allows European Union (EU) member states to choose how to do their share in the distribution of the costs connected to asylum. According to one of the proposals contained in the Pact, member states have the option to contribute to the distribution through return sponsor-ship, taking measures to facilitate the return of irregular migrants residing in other member states. This paper asks: should EU member states be allowed to discharge their solidarity obligations through return sponsorship as envisaged by the Pact? Scholars of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have raised several doubts about this proposal, particularly regarding the feasibility of return sponsorship and the related risks for human rights. Although the proposal is pragmatic in some respects, these problematic aspects pose at least two questions for normative political theorists: first, should member states be allowed to choose their form of contribution in a solidarity scheme? And, if so, should return sponsorship be one of the contributions allowed? Building on normative theories of solidarity in the EU, this article will argue that return sponsorship should be rejected both because it does not further solidarity among member states and because the rights of rejected asylum seekers set a strong presumption against it.