Optimum financial areas : retooling the governance of global finance

Abstract

This article analyses the political economy of financial stability under conditions of deep cross-border market integration, adapting the ‘joint products’ approach of Broz among others. Many argue that financial stability is a public good; we propose that it is inherently excludable and that particular conditions must obtain to ensure it is non-diminishable for all. The difficulties of providing financial stability arise because of the ‘club goods’ nature of monetary and financial systems. We then propose six institutional preconditions that can stabilize a financial market that is integrated across multiple regulatory jurisdictions. We use case studies of Great Britain, the US, and Canada to show how national governments have dealt with these political economy dilemmas to stumble toward similar arrangements to stabilize domestic financial market integration. Three criteria relate to the ‘technical substructure’ of markets, while three others focus on macro-prudential considerations. Together they constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the provision of financial stability. These criteria generate political economy obstacles both individually and as an interdependent package but can mitigate the costly dynamics of financial market disintegration in times of crisis. We argue that these criteria can be applied across national boundaries as well as across regulatory jurisdictions within them.