Type: Working Paper
International jurdisdiction over standard-essential patents
Working Paper, EUI RSC, 2023/19, Global Governance Programme-497, [Global Economics]
HORN, Henrik, International jurdisdiction over standard-essential patents, EUI RSC, 2023/19, Global Governance Programme-497, [Global Economics] - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75446
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Countries are alleged to pursue commercial interests through their antitrust interventions regarding FRAND commitments for standard-essential patents (SEPs). This paper examines pros and cons of allocating jurisdiction according to fundamental principles in international law, assuming that countries' regulations promote national objectives. It shows why the Territoriality Principle yields too lenient treatment of patent-issuing countries' SEPs, and too strict of treatment of other countries' SEPs, and why the Nationality Principle yields too lenient treatment generally. Non-discrimination obligations can, but need not, improve on outcomes. Hence, existing international law will typically not implement efficient outcomes, suggesting that an international agreement is required.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75446
Series/Number: EUI RSC; 2023/19; Global Governance Programme-497; [Global Economics]
Publisher: European University Institute
Sponsorship and Funder information:
Financial support from the Swedish Competition Authority, and from Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius stiftelse, is gratefully acknowledged.
Files associated with this item
- RSCAS 2023.19.pdf
- Full-text in Open Access