Date: 2023
Type: Article
Discovering cooperation : endogenous change in international organizations
The review of international organizations, 2023, Vol. 18, pp. 631-666
LENZ, Tobias, CEKA, Besir, HOOGHE, Liesbet, MARKS, Gary, BURILKOV, Alexandr, Discovering cooperation : endogenous change in international organizations, The review of international organizations, 2023, Vol. 18, pp. 631-666
- https://hdl.handle.net/1814/76180
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO’s founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifes as an IO’s policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifcations, we fnd robust support for our argument.
Additional information:
Published online: 14 December 2023
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/76180
Full-text via DOI: 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0
ISSN: 1559-7431; 1559-744X
Publisher: Springer
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