Civilian non-violent defence against Russian Warfare - Eastern European strategies and the gap between civilians and combatants in customary IHL

Abstract

Russia’s war against Ukraine and the widespread documentation of civilian participation therein sheds new light on the role of civilians in national defence. This paper examines historic and contemporary Baltic and Ukrainian defence strategies against Russian and previous Soviet aggression and how national policies envisage and perhaps encourage civilians to engage in resistance and potentially in defence. The focus rests on the role of civilians who are not employed or subcontracted by the military but engage in acts ranging from singing national anthems to launching offensive cyber operations. The paper examines when such civilian participation amounts to direct participation in hostilities and the types of legal implications which follow from such activities. This paper takes a closer look at recent civilian participation in hostilities as seen in Ukraine, particularly focusing on intelligence gathering and cyber activities as conducted by the Ukrainian information technology (IT) army to illustrate the risks to which civilians expose themselves. This paper concludes that while there are legitimate reasons for States to include civilians in their defence strategies, it is key that where civilians engage in direct participation in hostilities, they must do so on an informed basis, setting out the legal implications of their actions. Where a State (passively) encourages such activities, it has at least a moral, if not also a legal obligation, to inform civilians of the risks of their actions.