dc.contributor.author | YORDANOVA, Nikoleta | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-11-10T11:18:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2009-11-10T11:18:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.citation | European Union Politics, 2009, 10, 2, 253-280. | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1465-1165 (print) | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1741-2757 (online) | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/12797 | |
dc.description.abstract | Although most of the legislative tasks of the European Parliament(EP)
are performed in its committees, it is controversial how representative
they are of the overall plenary. Distributive, informational and
partisan theories suggest respectively that the committee assignments
system is designed to (1) serve special interests outside the EP, (2)
bring informational benefits to the plenary or (3) promote partisan
interests. These propositions are examined via a representative sample
of committees using an original data set of MEPs' profiles in the 6th
European Parliament. The results show that, whereas information-driven
committees attract mainly MEPs with relevant expertise, homogeneous
special interests influence assignments to interest-driven and mixed
committees, turning them into preference outlying committees. However,
partisan considerations do not appear to influence individual
assignments strategically. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.title | The Rationale behind Committee Assignment in the European Parliament: Distributive, Informational and Partisan Perspectives | en |
dc.type | Article | en |