Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty
Title: Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty
Citation: Information Economics and Policy, 2012, Vol. 24, No. 3-4, pp. 212-230
ISSN: 0167-6245; 1873-5975
A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access regulation regimes – full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing – on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, when the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather than leaving the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-added services. Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.
Published version of EUI RSCAS WP 2012/15; First published online: December 2013
Initial version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21477
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