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dc.contributor.authorVAN DER SLUIS, Marijn 
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-20T13:23:00Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationFlorence : European University Institute, 2017en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/46925
dc.descriptionDefence date: 16 June 2017en
dc.descriptionExamining Board: Professor Bruno De Witte, EUI (Supervisor); Professor Deirdre Curtin, EUI; Professor Fabian Amtenbrink, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Professor Mark Dawson, Hertie School of Governance Berlinen
dc.description.abstractPrior to the euro, the topics of constitutional law and monetary policy rarely overlapped. Money was regulated, on the national level, through the ordinary legislative procedures. For European monetary union, the use of constitutional law was nevertheless attractive because it meant that the MS would be in control of the negotiation process, because it enabled a very independent central bank and because it kept the MS in control over the future of the euro. The lack of trust among MS to share a currency was overcome by an abundant trust in law. As the euro was negotiated as a constitutional currency, this created specific opportunities and obstacles for the different parts of the EMU. Once the euro finally came into existence, the constitutional framework of the euro proved remarkably stable for the first decade and a half. After the excitement of Maastricht, monetary policy very quickly became boring again, in no small part due to constitutional law. Unfortunately, EMU primary law was quite successful. During the euro-crisis, EMU primary law shaped the responses to the crisis by placing fewer obstacles on some routes to change than on others. As the crisis developed, some conflicts became the topic of much legal debate and even judicial decisions, whilst other parts of euro-crisis law met with few objections, despite some legally problematic aspects. The possibilities for further reform of the Eurozone without treaty change are then largely the result of the process of reform until now.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI PhD thesesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDepartment of Lawen
dc.relation.replaceshttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/36098
dc.relation.replaceshttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/46989
dc.relation.replaceshttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/46991
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessen
dc.subject.lcshConstitutional law -- European Union countries
dc.subject.lcshMonetary unions -- European Union countries
dc.subject.lcshMonetary policy -- European Union countries
dc.titleIn law we trust : the role of EU constitutional law in European monetary integrationen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.identifier.doi10.2870/455094
dc.embargo.terms2021-06-16
dc.date.embargo2021-06-16
dc.description.versionChapter 3 ‘The constitutional Euro' of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as a working paper 'The variable geometry of the eurocrisis: a look at the non-euro area Member States' (2015), 2015/33 EUI Working Paper Law.
dc.description.versionChapter 1 ‘Monetary policy and constitutional law before the euro' of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as a contribution 'Maastricht revisited: economic constitutionalism the ECB and the Bundesbank' (2014) in the book ‘The constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints’
dc.description.versionThe conclusion of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as an article 'EU law for a new generation?' (2016) in the journal ‘International journal of constitutional law’


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