Four essays on dynamic evolutionary models in economics and game theory
Title: Four essays on dynamic evolutionary models in economics and game theory
Author: SACCO, Pier Luigi
Date: 1993
Citation: Florence, European University Institute, 1993
Series/Number: EUI PhD theses; Department of Economics
LC Subject Heading: Game theory; Evolution -- Mathematical models
Table of Contents:
-- Noise traders permanence in stock markets : an evolutionary approach
-- Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games
-- Coevolution of social norms with noisy enforcement
-- Bertrand vs. Cournot : an evolutionary approach
Description:
Defence date: 15 March 1993; Examining board: Peter Hammond, Stanford University ; Prof. Christopher Harris, Nuffield College, Oxford ; Prof. Alan Kirman, E.U.I., supervisor ; Prof. Robert Waldmann, E.U.I. ; Prof. Stefano Zamagni, University of Bologna
Version: Chapter 3 ' Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games' generalizes previous work by ourselves [Sacco, P.L. 1992. “On the Dynamics of Social Norms.” Preprint, presented at the Second Workshop on Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello]
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