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dc.contributor.authorSACCO, Pier Luigien
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-09T08:29:21Z
dc.date.available2006-06-09T08:29:21Z
dc.date.issued1993en
dc.identifier.citationFlorence, European University Institute, 1993
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/5052
dc.descriptionDefence date: 15 March 1993
dc.descriptionExamining board: Peter Hammond, Stanford University ; Prof. Christopher Harris, Nuffield College, Oxford ; Prof. Alan Kirman, E.U.I., supervisor ; Prof. Robert Waldmann, E.U.I. ; Prof. Stefano Zamagni, University of Bologna
dc.descriptionPDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017
dc.description.tableofcontents-- Noise traders permanence in stock markets : an evolutionary approach -- Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games -- Coevolution of social norms with noisy enforcement -- Bertrand vs. Cournot : an evolutionary approachen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI PhD thesesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDepartment of Economicsen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.subject.lcshEvolution -- Mathematical models
dc.titleFour essays on dynamic evolutionary models in economics and game theoryen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.neeo.contributorSACCO|Pier Luigi|aut|
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.description.versionChapter 3 ' Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games' generalizes previous work by ourselves [Sacco, P.L. 1992. “On the Dynamics of Social Norms.” Preprint, presented at the Second Workshop on Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello]


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