Instrumentalizing EMU’s democratic deficit : the ECB’s unconventional accountability measures during the eurozone crisis
Journal of European integration, 2019, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 447-463
TESCHE, Tobias, Instrumentalizing EMU’s democratic deficit : the ECB’s unconventional accountability measures during the eurozone crisis, Journal of European integration, 2019, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 447-463 - http://hdl.handle.net/1814/58065
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
This article shows that the quasi-fiscal nature of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures and its troika membership created three mutually reinforcing threats to its political independence. First, it led to a rising level of public distrust in the ECB. Second, it triggered an elite dissensus on whether political independence of central banks was still the appropriate solution to the time inconsistency problem. Third, it created institutional overburdening with negative repercussions for the central bank’s output legitimacy. Faced with this diverse set of challenges in creditor and debtor countries, the ECB exploited EMU’s democratic deficit by relying on visits to national parliaments to preserve its independence.
Published online: 29 Aug 2018
Cadmus permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/58065
Full-text via DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2018.1513498
ISSN: 0703-6337; 1477-2280
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Keyword(s): European Central Bank Accountability Euro area Central bank independence Monetary policy
Succeeding version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/62526
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