dc.contributor.author | MAZUR, Karol | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-12T13:26:16Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-12T13:26:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Florence : European University Institute, 2019 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/64924 | |
dc.description | Defence date: 8 November 2019 | en |
dc.description | Examining Board:
Prof. Árpád Ábrahám, University of Bristol, (Supervisor);
Prof. Ramon Marimon, European univeristy Institute;
Prof. Joseph Kaboski, University of Notre Dame;
Prof. Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis, MOVE-UAB and Barcelona GSE | en |
dc.description.abstract | The thesis is composed of four stand-alone essays analyzing economic problems pertinent to social insurance and allocation of resources in three applications to development, education and labor. The first essay investigates co-operative patterns of farmers in rural India engaging into informal insurance and public irrigation provision. I demonstrate theoretically, empirically and quantitatively that these two margins of co-operation reinforce each other, if the irrigational infrastructure is managed by local societies. On the other hand, management by external government agencies is associated with excessive crowding-out of informal insurance. The second essay investigates constrained efficiency of a model with educational investments subject to uninsurable dropout risk, moral hazard and an endogenous college wage premium. I show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is constrained inefficient and is characterized by under-education. To this end, I show that an optimally designed student loan program with graduation-contingent repayment rates can attain the allocative efficiency of second best. In the third essay, I show in a simple model of lumpy educational investments that subjective pessimism over returns to education can be self-confirmed in equilibrium. This leads to two empirical implications: (i) both the degree of human capital concentration and the degree of educational investments misallocation may be increasing in the rigidity of the education system’s design; and (ii) commonly pursued methods may not identify the true underlying skill distributions. The fourth essay uses a quantitative model of labor search with unemployment insurance and voluntary quits to study welfare consequences of a policyreform giving entitlement to workers quitting their jobs in the US. Structural results show that pursuing a generous entitlement policy for quitters may allow for significant welfare gains through improved insurance and allocation of workers. Moreover, I employ the assumption of monetary search costs and show that it can explain the empirically documented unemployed search behavior. | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | -- 1 Sharing Risk to Avoid Tragedy in Village Economies
-- 2 Student Loans with Risky Graduation and College Wage Premium
-- 3 A Note on Pessimism in Education and its Economic Consequences
-- 4 Can Welfare Abuse be Welfare Improving? | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | PhD Thesis | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.subject.lcsh | Resource allocation | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Social security | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Welfare economics | |
dc.title | Essays on social insurance and allocation of resources | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2870/917432 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |