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dc.contributor.authorPATRIN, Maria
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-15T14:37:14Z
dc.date.available2022-12-15T14:37:14Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/75132
dc.descriptionPublished online: 18 February 2021en
dc.description.abstractThe European Commission’s handling of the coronavirus vaccine deployment has recently caused quite some turmoil. At the end of January, the Commission publicly displayed its frustration over AstraZeneca’s decision to unilaterally cut the supply of vaccines destined to the EU, thus contravening to the contract signed with the Commission earlier in 2020. AstraZeneca CEO’s declared that such contract merely obliged the company to make its “best effort” to supply the European Union (EU) with the agreed 400 million vaccines, but did not amount to a legal obligation. In reaction, the Commission put forward a proposal for an export control mechanism allowing the EU to monitor vaccines exports and to block international shipments in case the EU’s orders were not duly met. In this context the Commission initially proposed to trigger Article 16 of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, an emergency provision allowing unilateral override of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement (which had preserved the Good Friday Peace Agreement). The Commission thus effectively stood for the introduction of a customs border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, after years of negotiations to avoid precisely that. Understandably, such a move spurred a wave of lively protests from Ireland, the UK and many other national capitals, and led to harsh questioning from MEPs. The reference to Article 16 was quickly taken back. The Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen publicly apologised and acknowledged the mistake. Yet, the damage was done. Since then, one question hovers around Brussels and in the national capitals: How could such a huge diplomatic screw-up happen? Such a mistake would be bad enough for any governing coalition. For the Commission, which is a collegial institution, it is explosive. “If the Commission is collegiate, why didn’t the cabinets of the other Commissioners notice? Had they all taken an early weekend on Friday last?”, observes Senator Michael McDowell in an interview with the Irish Times (Irish Times, 3/2/2021). Apparently, and here lies the main problem, most cabinets, including the one of the Irish Commissioner, were neither informed of the decision nor involved in the decision-making process. The misstep is not only a naïve and clumsy mishandle of a very delicate political issue. It points to the shortcomings of a whole system of governance which may become inadequate to come to terms with the current situation. It let us glimpse behind the doors of the Commission’s decisions to observe that what used to be collegial decisions have become in fact exclusive prerogative of the Commission’s President.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUIdeasen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBlogposten
dc.relation.ispartofseries2021en
dc.relation.urihttps://euideas.eui.eu/2021/02/18/when-collegiality-matters-or-of-von-der-leyens-loneliness/en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectCovid-19en
dc.subjectCOVID-19en
dc.subjectCoronavirusen
dc.titleWhen collegiality matters… or of Von der Leyen’s lonelinessen
dc.typeOtheren


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